Author: CCCAV

Agreeing and disagreeing: Australia’s critical deficit in China knowledge

By Jocelyn Chey

19 December 2023

Posted with permission. The original article can be viewed at: https://johnmenadue.com/agreeing-and-disagreeing-australias-critical-deficit-in-china-knowledge/

The recent Beyond the Mainstream Media essay series spells out the urgency for Australia to come to grips with our deficit in China knowledge. China is not going to decline or disappear, and the frictions and problems that remain in our bilateral relationship impact all of us in many different ways. We must find ways to get on with all our neighbours.

“Cooperate where we can, disagree where we must and engage in the national interest” is a neat formula, adopted by the Albanese government, and intended to apply to all aspects of Australia’s relations with China. Its simplicity is hard to argue with, but when we consider how to apply it to this or that issue, it is quickly revealed to be hard to implement.

The formula itself needs to be evaluated and its details spelled out clearly. This is an urgent matter, because China is not going to decline or disappear, and the frictions and problems that remain in our bilateral relationship impact all of us in many different ways. While some recommend economic and technical decoupling, in reality, this is impossible. Diversification of trade and investment is always a good idea, but no other economy can totally replace China. We must find ways to get on with all our neighbours, including China.

A recent series of essays titled Beyond the Mainstream Media described some of the complexities of the relationship, highlighting problems and opportunities. Starting with a post on 28 August, Marina Zhang outlined the complexities of institutional logic in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In September, Haiqing Yu wrote about the rapid development of AI and suggested that there were opportunities for cooperation in this field; while Shi Xue Dou and Chris Cook pointed to the hazards in such exchanges due to Australia’s anti-China security regulations. Several contributors in September reflected on the bilateral relationship – Colin Mackerras, Marilyn Lake, Percy Allan, and Jingdong Yuan.

John Barclay wrote in October about his newly-published book on education and library exchanges with China, and Meg Hart commented on propaganda and truth in the movie world. Others reflected on China and the emerging new world order – Kerry Brown, Yun Jiang, Gary Sigley and myself.

I made a short trip to Beijing to attend a conference at the Australian Studies Centre at Beijing Foreign Studies University and in November reflected on how Australia was seen from the other side. Michael Keane took an in-depth look at the place of humanities studies in China’s development plans. Richard Hu recounted the development of Australian Studies in China and the part they play in bilateral relations. Wanning Sun reported discussions at a bilateral symposium on gender and identity convened in Suzhou by the China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney and stressed the importance of such academic exchanges.

Also in November, contributors discussed the potential of bilateral cooperation in economic, technical and cultural fields. Marina Zhang explained the crucial role that China plays in global supply chains. Wei Li discussed the benefits of cooperation to solve climate issues. Nicholas Jose described the importance of cultural connections with China and Hong Kong.

Another thread in the Beyond the Mainstream Media series, published in November and December, included Merriden Varrall’s discussion of common misperceptions of the drivers of China’s foreign policy. Mobo Gao deplored bias in media reporting on China, and Minran Liu analysed media influence on Australia’s China policy.

Finally, in December, Jane Golley wrote about the recent decline in Australia’s China knowledge capability. This last essay is probably the most important of the whole series. All contributors have outlined important aspects of the bilateral relationship, revealing something of the extent to which China impacts on daily life in Australia. Surely it has never been more important to encourage teaching and research of Chinese language, history and culture, and to raise up a cohort of specialists to work in government, business and trade. Over the decades, reports and recommendations to foster Asian languages and Asian Studies in schools and universities have piled up on government department shelves, only to gather dust.

This essay series Beyond the Mainstream Media goes a very small way to compensate for the deficit in our China knowledge. It should be widely read, and the policy implications taken to heart.

Beyond good and evil: The mainstream media and stable relations with China

By Minran Liu

11 December 2023

Posted with permission. The original article can be viewed at: https://johnmenadue.com/beyond-good-and-evil-the-mainstream-media-and-stable-relations-with-china/

By going beyond the good and evil binary, the Australian media could play a more constructive role in fostering enduring stability between Australia and China, delineating a path that maintains Australia’s safety and integrity.

China, undeniably a significant actor on the global stage, is a nation with which Australia not only can but should seek coexistence and maintain a stable working relationship as part of an increasingly multipolar world order. Recognising that some differences may be irreconcilable, there remains ample room for cooperation.

Since mid-2022, after the Labour Party’s rise to power, initiatives by both Canberra and Beijing have mitigated the previously deteriorating trajectory, ushering in a more stable working relationship. Despite the absence of fundamental shifts in Australia’s China policy, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s recent diplomatic sojourn to China has indeed furthered auspicious indications. Following the visit, the dynamics of the Australia-China relationship have seemingly reached a new-found mutually accepted balance. Yet, this fragile relationship could inadvertently drift into unintended situations without careful management.

The role Australian mainstream media will play in this still-evolving relationship may be crucial.

That this role has been overlooked may be attributed partly to the common perception that faults lie in China’s actions rather than in Australia’s domestic rhetoric. This is only partly true. The enduring media depiction of China as the quintessential ‘Other’—a threat entrenched in the discourse affecting Australia’s security and values—is, in fact, consistent throughout Australia’s domestic discourse. Notwithstanding the frequent coverage of China and the Chinese-Australian diaspora by the Australian media in recent years, narratives have tended to depict the Sino-Australian relationship as a binary conflict between good and evil, compounded by some ‘inconveniences’ such as bilateral economic ties and the presence of Chinese communities in Australia.

It is conceivable that the Australian media could play a more constructive role in fostering enduring stability between Australia and China, delineating a path that maintains Australia’s integrity without conceding to real or perceived pressures from Beijing.

In the past, sensationalist media narratives routinely took China as the ‘Other’, creating an unwarranted urgency. Among them, there was a trend of evidence-free journalism suggesting an imminent Chinese attack on Australia without tangible proof. Some journalists routinely interpret China’s military readiness and exercises as preparatory steps for warfare, although such activities are often unrelated to Australia or are part of regular operations. This trend has skewed perceptions to the extent that, as the 2022 Lowy Institute public opinion poll found, a more significant proportion of Australians anticipated an attack by China than did the people of Taiwan. China’s assertive policies certainly played a role in moulding opinion, but the prevalent discourse and alarmism also greatly influenced sentiment.

A particularly egregious more recent instance was the ‘Red Alert’ series published in the Fairfax media in March 2023, which predicted on very shaky grounds that Australia could be embroiled in a war with China within three years, purporting to detail the initial 72-hour conflict timeline. They even dramatised a scenario whereby, following an outbreak of war over Taiwan, Australia would be subjected to Chinese missile strikes and crippling cyberattacks, marking the first assault on Australian soil since WWII. At the same time, American forces would ostensibly converge on Australia’s Top End.

Despite the continuous advancement of China’s Military Modernisation program and its intention, there remains a significant journey before China can seriously challenge the US and its alliance or become the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, much less manifest its power projection capabilities. On the contrary, the real challenge for Australia lies in navigating the delicate balance of interests between Australia and the US—essentially, to ‘right-size’ its relationship with the US.

Considering the geostrategic environment, Australia ranks as one of the world’s safest countries. Among other factors, the vast distances—a sprawling 4,000 kilometres between Australia’s northern maritime frontier and China’s southernmost Hainan province, and more than 7,500 kilometres from Sydney to major cities like Shanghai or Guangzhou—further diminish the likelihood of direct military encounter.

Considering also China’s dependence on Australian raw materials for its ongoing development—even if this has recently slowed, it is not strategically sustainable for Beijing to employ economic sanctions that could inflict reciprocal harm. These two economies are not just interdependent; they are, in essence, complementary. While the media frequently spotlight China’s economic prowess and enduring influence over Australia and regional geopolitics, they seldom acknowledge its vulnerability and its reliance on Australia. This nuance partially accounts for the failure or limited success of Beijing’s stringent economic sanctions against Australia.

Crucially, the media’s representation could also influence the breadth of debate within Australia on the nature of China-Australia relations. Many prominent scholars in China-Australia relations who diverge from the mainstream are disparaged as either the ‘China Lobby’ or ‘misinformed.’ Australians who present alternative perspectives on China are routinely sidelined and subjected to personal attacks online and in various forums, especially those who have Chinese affiliations or heritage.

When the media routinely portrays China as the ‘Other’—a threat entrenched in the discourse affecting Australia’s security and values and disproportionately amplifying the imminent threat, there is a danger of neglecting the positive economic activities and people-to-people relations that should also inform Australia’s approach to that country. Persisting with this trajectory risks an unending erosion of Sino-Australian relations, potentially squandering opportunities for Australia to benefit from closer engagement.

An inclusive attitude to Australians of Chinese heritage is also essential to the nation’s societal and democratic health. A comprehensive study by Wanning Sun of UTS published in August 2023 revealed that while Chinese Australians generally placed more trust in Australian media over Chinese state media, many were concerned about a lack of balance, depth, and independence in English-language media reports on China—a concern that warrants serious attention by itself.

Like every nation in the world, Australia has the sovereign right and responsibility to defend itself and enabling a more nuanced media narrative on China could be a significant step for Australia in pursuing its national interests, forging its path, and protecting its sovereignty.

“I wouldn’t start from here”: Advice on Australia-China relations

By Jocelyn Chey

13 October 2023

The original article can be viewed at: https://johnmenadue.com/i-wouldnt-start-from-here-advice-on-australia-china-relations-book-review/

Engaging China: How Australia can lead the way again (Sydney University Press 2023) reviews most aspects of the Australia-China relations and proposes useful ways to develop them for the national benefit. Jointly edited by Jamie Reilly and Jingdong Yuan, it includes contributions from thirteen scholars, journalists and former diplomats, a foreword by former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and a postscript by former Ambassador Stephen FitzGerald. It does not apologise for its advocacy of greater engagement in a productive and secure manner.

Maybe Australia can lead the way, as the book title suggests. That is, maybe Australia can demonstrate to the world that it is possible to work constructively with China even if there are differences of politics, philosophy and social practice. How could that not make the world a better place?

But can we? The famous Irish joke comes to mind, of the tourist who was told, when he asked the way to Dublin, “Well, if I wanted to get to Dublin, I wouldn’t start from here.” In other words, when all aspects of Australia’s relations with China have become securitised – that is, seen through the lens of defence and security concerns – how is it possible to change the mindset and view China as an opportunity and not a threat?

Reilly and Yuan summarise this well in their introductory chapter, describing the relationship as a kind of rudderless boat with “a sense of drift and uncertainty, seeking an elusive anchor and a stable balance between coexistence, cooperation and contestation.” The book comprises three sections. The first concerns diplomatic engagement, Geoff Raby writing from personal experience, Bates Gill warning of the dangers of escalating defence tensions, and Brendon O’Connor, Lloyd Cox and Danny Cooper broadening the discussion by reflecting on the role of US-China relations in shaping Australia’s international policies.

The second section, with contributions by James Laurenceson, Weihuan Zhou, Wei Li and Hans Hendrischke, describes economic and trade issues, problems, opportunities, the potential roles of multilateralism and of foreign direct investment. Glenda Korporaal adds vibrant colour to this picture with vignettes derived from her interviews with Australian companies concerning their business relations with China.

In the third section on media, education, culture and society, Wanning Sun applies the tools of media studies to assess how the China story is framed and presented in the Australian media, inviting the reader to consider the effect of their undoubted bias. Anthony Welch reflects on the significance of research collaborations and student exchanges, both affected by recent health and political events and by cuts in the funding of higher education. Ien Ang concludes with a summary of cultural exchanges over the past half century. She highlights the role of Chinese Australians in the bilateral relationship and how this growing community has been affected by the downturn in political relations and negative press reporting.

Much has been written about the downturn in Australia-China relations, reaching rock bottom in early 2022, as evidenced by warnings by the former Coalition government of the inevitability of war with China in the near future. The tangle of events that brought us to that impasse are canvassed in this book and hardly need to be repeated. They simply bring us back to the unfortunate fact that if we wanted to improve relations with China, it would be better not to start from here. Nevertheless, all the contributors to this book maintain their optimism. They emphasise that progress is possible and offer travel advice for the route ahead.

At the end of each chapter, after they have identified the routes that brought us to this starting point, each offers recommendations to Canberra and Beijing about how we may find a way out of the wilderness. Here are some of their proposals, all eminently sensible and practical:

• Craft a more independent foreign policy and “de-weaponise” the relationship
• Improve mutual trust, mitigate security tensions, reset defence ties
• Identify areas where collaboration is possible
• Protect economic interests in sustaining viable secure and mutually beneficial trade and investment relations
• Reactivate the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
• Agree to tackle strategic and security challenges including climate change, pandemic prevention, aid projects
• Reduce regional instability
• Manage trade and investment risks at systemic level
• No discrimination against businesses and households with mutually beneficial business engagement
• Review benefits and challenges of Chinese ODI in Australia and improve environment for investment from China and emerging economies
• Collaborate on research and exchanges in health care, aged care systems, emission technologies
• Encourage and support higher education and research engagement
• Strengthen people to people ties through sports, cultural and youth activities
• Invite mainstream media to review coverage of China and China relations to identify possible bias and increase accountability
• Nurture Chinese Australian communities through internal cultural diplomacy so as to counteract alienation
• Build on the achievements of cultural engagement over the past half century.

It may be that, by following some or hopefully all of these highways and byways, Australia will find a way forward, and will indeed lead the way again.